#Eutron bomb drivers

A tense strategic environment and the ERWвЂ™s high strategic value against Soviet armored divisions correlate with the programвЂ™s R&D but do not explain the fi al test in a more relaxed strategic environment. No variable individually explains the ERW programвЂ™s decisions and outcomes. On September 29, 1988, China successfully tested an ERW design and added it to what one weaponeer called the вЂњtechnology reserve.вЂќ The Central Committee approved the report and provided funding. In 1986, the weaponeers warned PRC leaders that the United States and Soviet Union could conclude a nuclear test ban treaty, and they proposed accelerated testing to complete warhead designs. The pause coincided with a Soviet moratorium on testing and a leadership reshuffle that neutralized ERW proponent General Zhang. In 1985, China halted nuclear testing for 30 months. One weaponeer metaphorically described the successful test by saying that вЂњthe second generation of light boats has passed the bridge.вЂќДЈ. On December 19, 1984, the weaponeers conducted a successful вЂњprinciples breakthroughвЂќ test. From 1982 to 1984, China conducted five tests related to the ERW and warhead miniaturization. By then, the weaponeers were dividing the ERW problem into constituent parts, or вЂњprinciples,вЂќ and solving them individually. The weapon fit into ChinaвЂ™s military strategic guideline of вЂњactive defenseвЂќ to defend against a Soviet armored thrust and invasion. delegation that China needed the ERW as a hedge against the Soviets. In 1980, General Zhang told a member of a visiting U.S. Ultimately, they acquiesced to orders and combined the ERW and warhead miniaturization research to master common principles of the two systems.Дў. Some weaponeers argued against developing the ERW, worrying that it was unnecessary and would disrupt higher priority work on warhead miniaturization. After General Zhang Aiping signaled the PRCвЂ™s interest in the ERW in the PeopleвЂ™s Daily, scientists involved in the ERW program (herein referred as the weaponeers) began initial research and development (R&D).

Soviet media denounced the ERW and grew concerned at ChinaвЂ™s silence on the controversy. decision to develop and deploy an ERW in Europe.

In 1977, Chinese media followed the controversy over the U.S. 1977вЂ“1980: Decision and Initial Research. The ERW programвЂ™s history comprised three phases:ДЎ. The framework also considers coalition politics of the ERW program as an intervening variable that influenced each of the above variables throughout the programвЂ™s history. Specifically, it assesses the strategic environment of the PRC, the strategic value and normative value of the ERW, as well as the resource demands and technical feasibility of the ERW program.

#Eutron bomb drivers

The framework considers five variables as potential drivers of ChinaвЂ™s ERW decisionmaking. This paper presents an analytic framework for examining how the technology reserve model might apply to ChinaвЂ™s decisionmaking on ballistic missile defense (BMD), antisatellite (ASAT), and hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) systems. This case study suggests a model of a вЂњtechnology reserveвЂќ in which China develops a weapons technology to match the capabilities of another state but defers deployment. This study exploits primary source documents to reconstruct the ERW programвЂ™s history, assesses drivers behind decisions throughout the program, and considers broader implications for PRC decisionmaking on weapons development. To date, however, these sources provide no evidence of deployment. intelligence and Chinese press reports indicate the PeopleвЂ™s Republic of China (PRC) was interested in an ERW in 1977 and successfully tested a device on September 29, 1988. ERWs, better known as вЂњneutron bombs,вЂќ are specialized nuclear weapons with reduced blast effects and enhanced radiation, making them ideal tactical and antipersonnel weapons. This paper examines why China developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it.